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Abstract 
 
Traditionally, economists make a sharp distinction between stated and revealed 
preferences, viewing the latter as more fully meeting the assumptions of economic 
analysis.  Here, we consider one form of empirical evidence regarding this belief: the 
consistency of choices in stated and revealed preference tasks.  We show that both kinds 
of task can produce consistent choices, suggesting that both can measure underlying 
preferences, if necessary conditions are met.  We propose that a necessary condition is 
that task be either familiar to those facing it or offer contextual cues that substitute for 
familiarity, such as prices in competitive markets or recommendations from trusted, 
knowledgeable sources.  We show that how well decision makers achieve such 
understanding is often confounded with the method that researchers use.  Considering 
task familiarity not only clarifies some of the conflicting evidence regarding revealed and 
stated preference methods, but raises potentially productive questions regarding the roles 
of social institutions in shaping preferences. 
 
Keywords: Consistency, contingent valuation, framing, public goods, revealed 
preferences, stated preferences, validity. 
 
JEL codes: D01, D03, Q51 
 
We are grateful to James Murphy and his co-authors for making the dataset of their meta-
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1. Introduction 
 
Economic analysis traditionally relies on revealed choice, arguing that, for practical 
purposes, individuals‟ preferences meet standard economic assumptions (e.g., Friedman 
1953).  Economists have maintained this position despite growing challenges (e.g., 
Simon 1956; Conlisk 1996; McFadden 2001; Ariely et al., 2003; Kahneman, 2003; 
Camerer and Fehr, 2006), partly because they lack an account of when these violations of 
its assumptions matter and partly because they distrust the alternative, stated preference 
methods.  On theoretical grounds, many economists are wary of stated preferences 
because they know how, in theory, individuals could respond strategically to questions 
about alternative levels of public good provision (Gibbard, 1973; Satterthwaite, 1975). 
On empirical grounds, many economists note the non-rational behavior first identified in 
stated preference studies (e.g., Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). 
 Despite the strength of this opposition, the evidence against stated preference 
methods is fairly limited (Dominitz and Manski 1997).  Many anomalies have been 
replicated in tasks with monetary stakes, indicating analogous problems with at least 
some revealed preferences (Camerer and Hogarth, 1999).  Moreover, the largest body of 
evidence suggesting problems with stated preferences comes from the somewhat 
anomalous context of contingent valuation surveys (Arrow et al. 1993; Mitchell and 
Carson, 1989), in which respondents state their willingness to pay for public goods that 
are far from their personal experience and have not been publicly discussed.  When those 
tasks are described in simple terms, they force respondents to figure out what exactly 
they are evaluating (Fischhoff and Furby, 1988).  When the tasks are described in specific 
terms, they pose cognitive demands on respondents.  It is hard for individuals to respond 
consistently when they do not know what question they are answering or cannot keep all 
its details in mind. 
 A continuing debate among dedicated scientists suggests that there is no single, 
general answer to the question of the relative validity of revealed and stated preference 
methods. However, there may be answers to where or when each is more valid (Fischhoff 
1991, p. 846; Slembeck and Tyran 2004, p. 683; Druckman 2004, p. 683; Shogren 2006, 
p. 169).  Here, we examine the cognitive tractability of revealed and stated preference 
tasks selected to vary on three features of the choice task: (a) whether the good is 
familiar, (b) whether informative contextual cues accompany the task, and (c) whether 
the good is private or public.  
 Section 2 defines our criterion for consistent preferences. Section 3 presents the 
three features of the choice task.  Section 4 examines selected studies representing the 
different possible combinations of these features, in terms of the consistency of the stated 
and revealed preferences that they produce. Section 5 reports statistical analyses of the 
roles of these features in predicting one form of consistency in a large set of studies. 
Section 6 concludes with a proposal for viewing revealed and stated preferences as 
complementary, rather than competing approaches, illuminating different aspects of 
preference-forming processes.  
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2. Empirical consistency criteria 
 
Economic theory and analysis are based on the axiomatic assumptions that preferences 
are complete and transitive. Preferences that satisfied these assumptions should 
demonstrate the kind of consistency that psychologists call construct validity. They 
should be (1) insensitive to irrelevant information, and (2) appropriately sensitive to 
relevant information. 
 A well-known violation of the first condition arises with anchoring effects, in 
which responses are affected by arbitrary numbers (e.g., think of the last two digits of 
your Social Security number, before answering).  An example is the anchoring effect in 
responses to hypothetical referendum questions in contingent valuation surveys with 
“alternative bid designs”: The binary (yes/no) responses express lower values when the 
question is, “Would you pay [$1/$2/3$, etc]?” than when it is, “Would you pay 
[$10/$20/$30, etc.]?” (e.g. McFadden 2001).  An anchor can also convey information, 
such as what researchers believe the value to be.  If so, then responses should be sensitive 
to it. 
It is harder to establish whether sensitivity to relevant information is appropriate.  
Scope tests ask whether preferences increase with increases in the quantity of a good.  
However, these are vague tests, without specifying how great the sensitivity should be.  
Moreover, subadditivity, as in the finding that 57 wilderness areas were valued only 
about fifty percent more than one wilderness area (McFadden, 1994), has been explained 
in terms of “substitution effects and diminishing marginal rates of substitution” 
(Hahneman‟s (1994, p. 35). Hahneman‟s argument implies that respondents believe that 
the 57 wilderness areas are almost indistinguishable (hence are substitutable) and that 
there is little extra value in having an additional 56 (diminishing marginal utility). 
Thus, construct validity entails a theoretical argument, regarding which features 
matter to people (hence should evoke sensitivity) and how methodologically sound 
studies are.  Below, we outline construct validity arguments for the eight classes of study 
mentioned above (i.e., all combinations of familiar and unfamiliar, public and private 
goods, with and without informative contextual cues).   
We restrict the discussion to studies with between-subject designs, where different 
respondents evaluate, say, different amounts of a good.  Within-subject designs, where 
each respondent evaluates multiple versions of a good, inevitably provide hints as to what 
kinds of consistency researchers expect (Poulton, 1968, 1994; Frederick and Fischhoff 
1998, Amir and Levav 2008). 
 
3. Classification of choice domains 
 
In the analysis below, we use the following definitions: 
 (1) familiarity: extent of experience with the good (e.g., the proposed change of 
the specific wilderness areas). 
 (2) informativeness of contextual cues: how well they convey the issues relevant 
to the choice, either directly or through surrogates, such as market prices, medical advice, 
or public debates.  
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 (3) private vs. public goods: “private goods” are for personal consumption; 
“public goods” are public services or amenities, as might be evaluated with votes in 
hypothetical referenda or on rating scales. 
“Revealed preferences” (RP) refers to consequential choices. With private goods, 
they involve actual transactions.  With public goods, they require implementation rules, 
such as a simple majority voting rule with a coercive payment mechanism.  
“Stated preferences” (SP) refers to hypothetical choices without a clear, coercive 
implementation rule.  
Table 1 summarizes the 2x2x2x2 design of the analyses that follow.  
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
4. Exploratory analysis of consistency across choice domains 
 
4.1. Familiar private goods with informative contextual cues 
 
Many marketing studies and observational studies of consumer behavior have these 
properties. Taken together, they provide overwhelming evidence of price sensitivity, an 
essential form of choice consistency, in the preferences revealed in actual markets for 
gasoline, computers, air trips and many other goods.  Experimental studies of choice 
consistency, in such domains are inherently rare because natural choice sets and cues 
(e.g., equilibrium prices, advertisements, consumer advice) cannot be manipulated 
without creating unnatural cues that might elicit unrepresentative behavior.  For example, 
manipulating actual prices can send misleading (or just confusing) signals about quality, 
producing inconsistent choices.  Conversely, consistent choices can be overdetermined, 
potentially reflecting habitual responses, contextual cues, or social pressure, as well as 
tapping robust preferences (List 2004). 
 Revealed preferences.  In one well-known experimental test, with a familiar, 
private choice, and clear (contextual) price information, Dickie et al. (1987) offered 
boxes of strawberries door-to-door at different prices. The resulting demand curve 
suggests sensible sensitivity to price information, perhaps reflecting personal experience 
with the good, perhaps reflecting contextual cues from prices in ordinary markets. 
 Stated preferences.  Dickie et al. (1987) also asked other people the hypothetical 
question of how many boxes they would buy at the prices offered in the revealed 
preference portion of their study.  The hypothetical choices produced a demand curve 
similar to that for the actual ones. 
Indirect evidence of choice consistency with familiar private goods and 
informative contextual cues is seen in the weaker endowment effect found with 
experienced traders in market settings, compared to that found with inexperienced 
traders, unfamiliar with the good and market context (List 2004). 
 
4.2. Private goods, directly experienced but without informative contextual cues 
 
Strong experimental tests of construct validity, for such choices, are difficult because it is 
hard to remove natural context cues (e.g., competitive market prices) without creating an 
unnatural choice, potentially inducing unrepresentative behavior. 
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Revealed preferences.  Removing familiar contexts is, however, a staple of 
marketers, hoping to entice consumers into making choices inconsistent with their normal 
preferences.  To this end, casinos use chips (rather than money), have no clocks, and ply 
gamblers with drinks.  Gamblers‟ remorse is a special, sometimes tragic case of 
inconsistent choices in revealed preferences.  
Stated preferences. Experiments involving familiar private goods, but without 
their normal informational context are also a staple of psychological and behavioural 
economics researchers, seeking inconsistent choices that will demonstrate inappropriate 
sensitivity to contextual cues.  Loomis et al. (1997), however, showed cases in which 
choices regarding a fairly familiar good (a wildlife art print) offered in unusual contexts 
were sensitive to experimental variations in price.  In a demonstration of the power of the 
cues provided by within-subject designs, Frederick and Fischhoff (1998) found that stated 
willingness to pay for toilet paper was 2.5 times more sensitive to quantity when it was 
manipulated within rather than between subjects, indicating either that the former choices 
were too sensitive or that the latter were insufficiently sensitive (Frederick and Fischhoff 
1998).  Levin and Gaeth (1988) found a case in which great familiarity with a product 
(ground beef) overcame an experimental attempt to manipulate contextual cues – seen in 
failure to find a familiar framing effect.  
 
4.3. Private goods, without direct experience, but with informative contextual cues 
 
Here, although individuals are unfamiliar with the goods themselves, they have access to 
useful cues, for instance from market context or from a trustworthy source with enough 
information to make consistent choices possible.  That source might be a knowledgeable 
relative, consumer organization, or government regulator.  The source must know enough 
about the decision makers to identify the facts (and uncertainties) most relevant to their 
choices.  The relevant knowledge might include predicting how those individuals will 
experience novel goods.  Taking advantage of such sources requires being able to assess 
their knowledge and honesty.  Many investors feel that they have misplaced their trust in 
financial advisors, who have proven to lack one property or the other. 
 Revealed preferences. Slembeck and Tyran (2004) find that the „three-door 
anomaly‟, a systematic violation of payoff-maximizing individual behavior in an 
experimental game, is eliminated when individuals have access to contextual cues in the 
form of communications from competing, better-performing participants in the game. 
 Stated preferences. Haward et al. (2008) presented subjects with the (fortunately) 
unfamiliar hypothetical choice between resuscitation and palliative (or “comfort”) care 
for extremely premature infants.  However, even an impoverished description provided 
enough information for individuals who describe themselves as “highly religious” to 
resist a common framing manipulation.  Namely, they responded consistently whether the 
outcomes were described in terms of survival and health or death and disability.  Thus, 
some preferences reveal themselves, as soon as individuals are asked to state them.  
 
4.4. Unfamiliar private goods, without informative contextual cues 
 
Life sometimes surprises people with unfamiliar choices without any clarifying context.  
Experimental researchers do that as a matter of course, as they create novel formulations 
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designed to inform theoretical questions.  Indeed, there can be a “curse of cleverness,” 
whereby the more innovative a task is, the less individuals can perform it consistently.  
When studies seek to highlight processes that are not easily seen in everyday life, the 
prevalence of (in)consistent preferences in them says little about their prevalence under 
more normal circumstances. 
 Revealed preferences. Preferences in this domain have been shown to be easily 
influenced by irrelevant information and not appropriately sensitive to relevant 
information. Behavioral economists have amply identified cases in which market choices 
are inconsistent with one another, not to mention consumers‟ best interests (Ariely, 2008; 
Thaler and Sunstein, 2008).  For example, Ariely et al. (2003) showed that willingness to 
pay for goods like bottles of wine (by students unfamiliar with the specific kinds) was 
affected by obviously arbitrary numbers (digits from their social security cards), to which 
their attention had previously been drawn.  Tilman and Slembeck (2004) found that 
participants in an unfamiliar game did not appropriately update their preferences, given 
new information, unless they had access to informative contextual cues from better 
informed participants (cf. 4.3).  One non-monetary example is the much greater rate of 
organ donation when it is the default, compared to where one must opt into it (Johnson et 
al., 2003).  Thaler and Sunstein (2008) show the power of such defaults, with unfamiliar 
private goods and impoverished contexts. 
Stated preferences.  Studies with lightly described private goods are a staple of 
stated preference studies designed to demonstrate respondents‟ sensitivity to normatively 
irrelevant cues. For example, Coupey et al. (1998) show sensitivity (preference reversals) 
to task details that should be irrelevant (choice vs. matching format) in stated preferences 
for unfamiliar products like “reverse osmosis filters.”  Even when the good is ostensibly 
familiar (e.g., a coffee mug in an endowment effect study; Kahneman et al., 1990), the 
social setting of the specific experiment will not be.  If the preference applies to an 
interpersonal exchange, then the good cannot be isolated from it – meaning the choice in 
an experiment is unfamiliar even when the good is common.  
One operational test for whether cues are “informative” is whether preferences are 
affected by adding them in a non-coercive way.  For example, Huffman et al. (2007) 
found that preferences for GM food stabilized when accompanied by information about 
the positions of politically involved third parties, who could be assumed to have worked 
through the issues from their perspective. 
 
4.5. Familiar public goods, with informative contextual cues 
 
At the end of idealized political processes, the public goods at issue are familiar and 
citizens‟ choices are informed (e.g., Lupia and Matsusaka, 2004).  That reality, of course, 
is always something less.  Indeed, political scientists often focus on “issue publics,” 
individuals who care enough to familiarize themselves with a public good and its context 
(e.g., how will its costs and benefits be distributed, what precedents will it set).  The issue 
public is held to interpret issues for others sharing their values.  Whether even they can 
master the specific issue and context is an empirical question (Fischhoff, 1991).   
Revealed preferences. Preferences for public goods are most clearly revealed in 
behaviours like voting, canvassing, and making political contributions.  Experiments are 
uncommon, given that public goods often become familiar through political processes 
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that are not amenable to the experimental manipulations needed for consistency tests.  As 
a result, such tests tend to be limited to choices about contributions to public goods.  
Such studies sometimes find inconsistent revealed preferences.  For example, even after a 
withering national election campaign, voter turnout (a measure of caring about the result) 
could still be increased by several percentage points by the simple intervention of asking 
registered voters where they would be prior to voting (Nickerson and Rogers, 2010).  
Envisioning that place and the path from it to the polls provided context that was 
otherwise missing.  A growing research area examines how alternative frames can affect 
charitable contributions for seemingly familiar public goods with ample contextual cues 
(e.g., people give more for identified beneficiaries than for the general causes that they 
represent; Small et al., 2007).  
 Stated preferences. Attitude surveys about public goods tend to provide few 
informative contextual cues, in deference to reducing respondents‟ cognitive load.  As a 
result, they will be discussed below (4.6).  Chong and Druckman (2007) found that, even 
with relatively familiar public policy issues, which had been widely covered in the news 
media, stated preferences were still subject to framing effects, until respondents received 
(forged) arguments from political information providers (see also Druckman, 2004; 
Druckman and Nelson, 2003; Tomz and Sniderman, 2005).  
 Although rarely used in experimental economics or psychology, deliberative 
processes are often used in applied settings to help people to articulate their preferences, 
by hearing and reflecting on alternative perspectives, chosen to provide contextual 
information.  Such clarifying interactions are central to decision analysis (Clemen & 
Reilly, 2002), which continues until clients‟ preferences pass consistency tests.  Morgan 
et al. (2001) describe the consistency achieved through a complex group deliberation 
about risk priorities.  Well-designed deliberative processes show the limits to 
consistency, while providing only indirect evidence regarding its natural occurrence. 
 
4.6. Familiar public goods, without informative contextual cues 
 
Preferences here involve public goods that may or may not seem to require the additional 
information provided by contextual cues. 
Revealed preferences.  Political advertising counts on the malleability of voting 
behavior for issues that have been regularly, but only superficially aired.  Its impacts are 
limited by the power of party identification.  People do not need to know very much 
about specific issues, if they follow party leaders who take consistent positions.  Political 
scientists study how individuals respond to such naturally occurring circumstances.  
Researchers are rarely in a position to create them. 
Stated preferences.  Public opinion polls normally fall into this category, letting 
the issues speak for themselves.  Polls released to the general public sometimes elicit the 
strength of respondents‟ preferences, but rarely examine their internal consistency.  
Proprietary polls done for political candidates often look for inconsistency, seeking the 
context that evokes the most desirable preferences.  Several of the experimental studies 
on political behaviour mentioned in Section 4.5 found that, absent cues such as party 
labels, preferences tended to be inconsistent with one another (Tomz and Sniderman 
2005) or with expressed political attitudes (e.g. Druckman and Nelson 2003). 
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4.7. Unfamiliar public goods, with informative contextual cues 
 
It is a triumph of political deliberations when they take public goods from obscurity to 
fully informed status.  As mentioned, the reality is often less satisfying. Even voters who 
know the main arguments of both sides still may not be comfortable making their 
decisions without considering contextual cues, such as party labels. 
 Revealed preferences.  In actual voting, although experimentally manipulating 
information is impossible, it is possible to assess the consistency of preferences for voters 
with different amounts of contextual information.  Lupia (1994) finds that otherwise 
uninformed voters who knew the positions of interested parties voted as consistently as 
well-informed voters with similar stakes riding on an issue. 
Stated preferences.  Researchers who present unfamiliar public good issues often 
provide little context, preferring to evoke intuitive responses.  Indeed, many social 
scientists are averse to providing context, lest they unnaturally bias or deepen 
respondents‟ preference (Fischhoff, 1991).  Other researchers embrace reactive 
measurement, seeking to change respondents is a disciplined way.  For example, 
deliberative polling (Fishkin, 1991; Luskin et al., 1997) tries to present balanced 
perspectives on an unfamiliar issue, in the context of group discussions moderated to 
facilitate airing and clarifying of alternative perspectives.  Like decision analysis, these 
processes proceed until they reach the most consistent preferences possible, hence 
provide only indirect evidence regarding the natural prevalence of consistent preferences. 
In a demonstration of the power of trusted authorities to provide useful contextual 
cues for unfamiliar public goods, Druckman (2001) found that forged party positions 
reduced framing effects with Tversky and Kahneman‟s (1981) Asian disease problem.  In 
experimental studies, providing actual party positions afforded hypothetical voters 
enough contextual information to form consistent preferences, as reflected in their 
sensitivity to price (Schläpfer et al., 2008).  The predictive validity of many pre-election 
polls suggests that they can evoke the context of the actual voting, although they seldom 
assess how well voters understand the context (Vossler and Kerkvliet 2003). 
 
4.8 Unfamiliar public goods, without informative contextual cues 
 
Psychologists have long known that most survey respondents offer some opinion on 
almost any question, no matter how unfamiliar the topic or how impoverished the context 
cues.  A classic example is that 70% of survey respondents expressed an opinion on a 
fictitious Metallic Metals Act although no such act existed and, therefore, the respondents 
could have no actual knowledge (Gill, 1947; cited in Plous, 1991, p. 55).  Some such 
respondents do not want to admit ignorance.  Some assume that they can guess what the 
issue is, based on the brief description.   
In such cases, the good is not only unfamiliar, but undefined.  Fischhoff and 
Furby (1988) present one framework for specifying choices well enough that consistent 
preferences are possible.  If everything needs to be spelled out, then the cognitive load 
could be unmanageable.  However, informative contextual cues can reduce that load by 
directing respondents to critical issues and proposing possible decision rules. 
Revealed preferences.  Despite theoretical arguments regarding the informational 
value of advertising, those using it often seek to manipulate contextual cues in their favor.  
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Their opportunities are greatest when the good is unfamiliar or misunderstood.  When 
marketers are successful, the contextual cues determine which features are essential to the 
good‟s definition.  For instance, Great Britain‟s close national referendum on joining the 
EU was reportedly tipped by framing it as “stay in Europe,” rather than “join Europe,” a 
distinction discovered through research into what is now called the “status quo bias.”  
Contingent valuation surveys are sometimes described as producing results that 
will affect policies regarding public goods.  If that claim is accepted, then responses 
might reveal (rather than just state) preferences.  It also heightens theoretical concern 
about strategic responses, understating or overstating a good‟s value, based on how 
respondents assess the opportunities for slanting results to their advantage (Gibbard, 
1973; Satterthwaite, 1975; see also Green et al., 1998; Champ et al. 2002; Flores and 
Strong, 2007; Schläpfer and Bräuer, 2007; Schläpfer and Schmitt, 2007).  
 Stated preferences.  Manipulation checks ask respondents to recall and make 
inferences about details of questions that they have just answered.  Without them, there is 
no direct way of telling how familiar the issue was.  The power of framing, and other 
context effects, arises from respondents‟ need to rely on contextual cues, in order to 
articulate reasoned answers to incompletely specified questions.  In many experimental 
studies, those cues are deliberately uninformative, so that researchers can demonstrate an 
“effect,” whereby people respond to irrelevant information.  The psychological and 
contingent valuation literatures have many such examples (Tversky and Kahneman, 
1981; Fischhoff and Manski, 1999; Lichtenstein and Slovic, 2005; Mc Fadden 2001).  
These demonstrations show how inconsistent preferences can be with goods that are both 
incompletely specified goods and without informative contextual cues. Ironically, the 
same lack of information and context can also encourage insensitivity to relevant 
information, such as the quantity or „scope‟ of a good (Boyle et al., 1994; McFadden, 
1994).  One of the few stated preference studies with manipulation checks found that 
preferences were more consistent when evaluated in terms of what respondents believed 
about the goods, compared to what was explicitly stated (Fischhoff et al., 1993). 
 
4.9. Discussion 
 
Thus, both consistent and inconsistent preferences have been found with both revealed 
and stated preferences, in most of these eight domains.  As the discussion suggested, 
some domains are much more heavily studied than others, reflecting research 
opportunities (e.g., for experimental manipulations) and researcher predilections (e.g., for 
minimal or hypothetical descriptions).  Because these predilections differ by academic 
discipline, researchers typically work in a subset of possible domains and see the patterns 
of consistency that it typically produces.  It would only be natural, if they came to see 
such results as typical in the world.   
The present analysis finds that preference consistency seems to increase as 
choices become better understood, whether through familiarity with the good or receipt 
of informative contextual cues.  That is seen in contrasts across domains, created to vary 
on these two features, and within domains, for choices varying on these two factors.  The 
analysis did not suggest any systematic impacts of the other two features: whether the 
good was public or private and whether preferences were revealed or stated.  In studies 
(and in the world), public and private goods tend to vary in how well they are understood.  
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So do revealed and stated preference tasks.  As a result, differences in preference 
consistency reflect those covariates (familiarity, informative contextual cues), not the 
public/private or revealed/stated distinction. 
The following section examines whether these patterns emerge in the universe of 
preferences represented in one set of published studies. 
 
 
5. Explaining “hypothetical bias” in stated preferences: a meta-analysis regression 
 
The preceding analysis suggested that preference consistency depends on how well 
choice tasks are understood.  That depends, in turn, on the familiarity of the good and the 
informativeness of the accompanying contextual cues.  Preference consistency does not, 
however, depend on whether the good is private or public good or whether the 
preferences are revealed or stated. 
The studies used as examples were selected to illustrate these cases.  This section 
examines these patterns in a set of studies collected for other purposes.  Specifically, it 
asks how well three of these features (public/private, familiarity, cue informativeness) 
predict a form of consistency defined by the fourth: whether stated and revealed 
preferences agree.  A standard measure of such consistency is hypothetical bias, the ratio 
of willingness to pay expressed in stated preference tasks (with hypothetical choices) and 
in revealed preference tasks (involving actual payments).  These ratios vary widely 
enough, across studies, to justify the search for covariates.  
The set of studies is drawn from Murphy et al. (2005).  They used OLS to predict 
hypothetical bias from six factors: whether the good is public or private, whether the 
preferences are from students or other (perhaps more strongly motivated) individuals, 
whether preferences are elicited from individuals or (possibly more thoughtful) groups, 
whether preferences were expressed or an open-ended scale or choices among fixed 
options that might suggest expected answers (e.g., possible prices); whether the design 
was between-subjects or within-subjects (which might have suggested expected answers); 
and whether preferences were somehow “calibrated” in order to be more consistent (see 
Murphy et al. 2005, p. 318).  They considered 28 studies, with 83 observations, selected 
because of their accessibility in the peer-reviewed literature (see Appendix, Table A
1
 
Model 1a in Table 2 shows regression results for all 83 observations included in 
the original analysis. The only variable that strongly predicted a smaller hypothetical bias 
was using a within-subject design.  Murphy et al. note that “attempts to identify other 
factors that may be associated with hypothetical bias yielded mixed results.” 
For these purposes, two of these six predictors seem problematic.  As mentioned, 
within-subject designs can signal the features that interest the researchers, thereby 
inducing consistency (Fischhoff and Bar Hillel, 1984).  Calibration of responses attempts 
to eliminate the phenomenon of interest.  As a result, we reran the regression after 
                                                 
1
 The original dataset is available at: http://faculty.cbpp.uaa.alaska.edu/jmurphy/meta/meta.html#data 
(accessed 8 June, 2010. 
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eliminating the 44 observations having within-subject designs or calibration.
2
  Model 2a 
shows that hypothetical bias is somewhat smaller with private goods and choice tasks. 
 We now repeat these regressions, adding the two variables central to our analysis: 
familiarity with the good and access to informative contextual cues.
3
  Table A in the 
Appendix shows our coding of the 28 studies (with 83 observations) on these two 
additional variables.  Among them, 13 had unfamiliar goods without informative context, 
7 had unfamiliar goods with informative context, 5 had familiar goods without 
informative context, and 3 had familiar goods with informative context.   
Because Model 1b includes with-subject designs and calibration, we focus on 
Model 2b.  In it, hypothetical bias is significantly smaller for familiar goods and for 
informative contexts. The significant interaction indicates that familiarity and context are 
somewhat redundant contributors to more consistent preferences: contextual cues reduce 
hypothetical bias less with familiar goods than with unfamiliar ones.  Conversely, 
familiarity reduces bias less when people have access to contextual cues.  
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
Economists have traditionally made a strong distinction between revealed and stated 
preferences.  The former are usually held to meet the axiomatic assumptions for 
preferences, while the latter are often dismissed for their perceived inconsistency. 
However, as seen in Section 4, both consistent and inconsistent choices are found with 
both revealed and stated preferences.  We propose that consistent preferences are more 
likely when individuals understand tasks better, regardless of whether the choices involve 
public or private goods and regardless of whether the preferences are revealed or stated. 
We propose further that understanding can come two complementary routes.  One 
is familiarity with the good.  The second is receipt of informative contextual cues.  If 
revealed preferences studies are more likely to demonstrate consistent preferences, it is 
because those studies are more likely to involve well-understood tasks.  The analysis in 
Section 4 provides reasons why this might be the case.  For example, stated preference 
studies can (and often do) use choices invented for research purposes.  Conversely, 
revealed preference tasks do sometimes occur in life, with relatively fixed and familiar 
properties and context.  
We supplement this illustrative discussion with statistical analysis of a sample of 
studies, collected by Murphy et al. (2005) for other purposes (thereby reducing the 
chances that they were selected to confirm our hypotheses).  In their full sample, the only 
predictor of choice consistency was using a within-subject design, which can signal how 
to be consistent.  Removing those studies, along with ones that “calibrated” responses to 
be more consistent, revealed two predictors of consistency: using private (rather than 
public) goods and eliciting preferences with choice (rather than rating scale) responses.  
However, those predictions vanished when familiarity and contextual cues were added to 
                                                 
2
 The dropped observations include 17 within-subject observations from Sinden (1988), multiple 
observations in Blumenschein et al. (2001) and Johannesson et al. (1998), and calibrated observations by 
List (2001) and List (2003), cited in Murphy et al. 2005. 
3
 The correlation between the two variables is r=0.16. 
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the equations.  Thus, the other two predictors seem to have mattered because they were 
more likely in studies postulated as having better understood tasks.  
If this result is robust, then concern over revealed versus stated preferences has 
been misplaced, obscuring the more important question of when people understand tasks 
well enough to make consistent responses.  We propose that one class of determinants 
has to do with how familiar individuals are with a good.  Whether a good is public or 
private may predict familiarity, for researchers who focus on familiar private goods.  
Private goods may also have a more natural set of informative contextual cues, such as 
prices on competitive markets or popularity among personally relevant individuals.  
However, those correlations are not exclusive.  Political campaigns and policy debates 
can make public goods quite familiar, as well as generate party positions providing 
important contextual cues.  Similarly, researchers and marketers can create entirely novel 
private goods for decision makers‟ consideration. 
From this perspective, the critical research question becomes what are the 
conditions that favor understanding choice tasks and, hence, consistent preferences.  The 
answers to that question can be used prescriptively, when the goal is to create those 
conditions (Fischhoff et al. 1999; Keeney and Raiffa, 1993; Payne et al. 1999).  The 
answers can be used descriptively when the goal is to understand how well natural 
circumstances have allowed individuals to master choice tasks (Fischhoff et al., 1980; 
Lichtenstein and Slovic, 2005).  In a mature research program, the two activities would 
be integrated.  Descriptive research would direct prescriptive efforts to make tasks clear, 
then assess their success.  Prescriptive work would identify barriers to understanding that 
could benefit from and inform descriptive research.  That integrated research program 
could, for example, examine the role of consequentiality of choices on their consistency.  
In other domains, it has proven theoretically productive to ask when increased incentives 
enhance or degrade performance or have no effect at all, absent help in understanding 
tasks (Camerer and Hogarth, 1999; Lerner and Tetlcok, 1999.; Milkman et al., 2009). 
The integration of descriptive and prescriptive research has long been part of the 
behavioural decision research, which grew out of mathematical, cognitive, and 
engineering psychology in the 1950s (Edwards, 1954; Kahneman et al., 1982 
vonWinterfeldt and Edwards, 1986).  It seems to be a historical coincidence that such 
integration has lagged as economics has strengthened its behavioural foundations.  One 
barrier has been the theoretically founded scepticism regarding stated preferences, 
reinforced by the fact that so many stated preference studies have involved unfamiliar 
goods presented with limited contextual cues (Manski 2000).  A second barrier has been 
the focus of revealed preference studies involving familiar goods where these issues were 
less relevant.  A third barrier has been the institutional pressures to defend many stated 
preference estimates, for example, when contingent valuations are used to defend damage 
settlements.  Such settings encourage doing the best study possible, then denying any 
residual problems.   
All researchers must work within the constraints of their funding and their 
discipline‟s norms.  However, all those concerned about assessing and informing 
preferences could benefit from better fundamental understanding of the conditions that 
favor consistent preferences.  That basic science can exploit and inform research in 
economics, psychology, political science, survey research, and other fields.  It raises 
questions such as what experiences make a good familiar enough that people can 
13 
anticipate their future experiences, which sources are trusted for providing contextual 
cues, which cues are most informative, and what insight do individuals have into how 
well they have articulated their own preferences. 
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Table 1. Classification of choice domains. 
Private vs. public good Familiarity (own 
experience) 
Informative contextual 
cues 
Private familiar present 
  absent 
 unfamiliar present 
  absent 
Public familiar present 
  absent 
 unfamiliar present 
  absent 
19 
Table 2. Ordinary least squares estimates of models explaining the ratio of hypothetical to actual willingness to pay. 
 Full dataset  Trimmed dataset
a
 
 Model 1a  Model 1b  Model 2a  Model 2b 
Variable Coeff. t-ratio  Coeff. t-ratio  Coeff. t-ratio  Coeff. t-ratio 
Constant 3.628*** 3.978  2.733*** 2.700  5.628*** 3.617  4.727*** 2.841 
Student 0.907 0.724  -2.434 -1.635  2.221 1.030  -1.167 -0.494 
Group 0.955 0.771  4.906*** 2.834  1.551 0.812  4.801* 1.897 
Private -0.065 -0.082  3.390*** 3.193  -2.935* -1.935  2.184 1.042 
Choice -1.167 -1.390  0.165 0.192  -3.134** -2.066  -1.499 -1.002 
Within -3.241*** -3.237  -3.162*** -3.480       
Calibrate -1.838* -1.846  -2.466*** -2.696       
Cues (C)    -1.991* -1.704     -3.665* -1.827 
Familiar (F)    -8.030*** -4.341     -9.062*** -3.123 
C x F    5.028** 2.402     6.723** 2.082 
n 83  83  39  39 
Adj. R
2
 0.08  0.26  0.13  0.30 
Notes: Significance levels: *: p<0.1; **: p<0.05; ***: p<0.01. 
a 
Within-subject comparisons and observations with “calibrated” values excluded. 
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Appendix Table A. Description of goods and choice contexts used in the study sample of the meta-analysis 
Study Good and choice context 
Coding 
Familiar Cues 
Blumenschein,et al. (1997) lab sunglasses to economics students 0 0 
Blumenschein et al. (2001) asthma management program to patients in “scientific 
study”, general population 
0 0 
Bohm (1972) preview of TV program at broadcast station, general 
population 
1 0 
Botelho and Costa Pinto (2002) contribution to NGO information campaign on river 
otters, at university, students 
0 0 
Boyce et al. (1989) common house plant in experiment, university staff at 
university 
1 0 
Brown et al. (1996) contribution to remove roads along Grand Canyon rim, 
mail survey/collection by university 
0 0 
Brown and Taylor (2000) contribution to NGO environmental program, at 
university 
0 0 
Cameron, et al. (2002) green electricity contribution, in established renewable 
energy and tree planting program (fixed 6$ surcharge) 
0 1 
Carlsson and Martinsson (2001) contribution to 3 environmental projects “rain forest”, 
“Mediterranean”, “Baltic sea”, students prior to lecture 
0 0 
Champ et al. (1997) contribution to remove roads along Grand Canyon rim, 
mail survey/collection by university 
0 0 
Champ and Bishop (2001) green electricity donation, actual wind power program 
of electric company, fixed surcharge 
0 1 
Duffield and Patterson (1992) contribution to Montana river mgt., contingent valuation 
survey context 
0 0 
Frykblom (1997) Swedish national atlas, volume “the environment”, prior 
to lecture 
1 0 
Frykblom (2000) Swedish national atlas, volume “the environment”, prior 
to lecture 
1 0 
Heberlein and Bishop (1986) hunting permits to hunters, issued by Department of 
Natural Resources 
1 1 
Johannesson et al. (1998) box of chocolates, displayed in front of students 1 1 
Kealy et al. (1988) familiar candy bars (Cadbury) 1 1 
List (2001) sports cards in existing market (list price of $200-250) 0 1 
List (2003) sports cards in existing market (book value of $12) 0 1 
List and Shogren (1998) sports cards in existing market ($350) 0 1 
Loomis et al. (1997) wildlife art print displayed to subjects, clerical and 
administrative staff on campus, auction context 
1 0 
MacMillan, et al. (1999) contribution to nature reserve, mail survey experiment, 
although mimicking regular collection 
0 0 
Murphy et al. (2002) contribution to environmental NGO, students at 
university 
0 0 
Neill et al. (1994) painting (list price $75), historical map replica (list price 
$20) shown to subjects, students at university 
0 0 
Sinden (1988) contribution to soil conservation program, students in 
class 
0 0 
Spencer et al. (1998) contribution to pond water monitoring program, student 
respondents 
0 0 
Vossler et al. (2003) pre-election poll on collectively provided public good, 
issue subject to public debate, general population 
0 1 
Vossler and Kerkvliet (2003) pre-election poll on collectively provided public good, 
issue subject to public debate, general population 
0 1 
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